Paper 41
[ Contents ]
THE COROWA PEOPLES CONFERENCE 2001:
applying the lessons of 1893, 1895 and 1999 to resolve the Australian head of state issue
Paper presented to a Seminar, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University, 29 March 2001
2001 is an extraordinary year for Australian politics. By the end of this year, Australian voters could have witnessed one federal, five state and territory elections, and one federal by-election. The Western Australian and Queensland state elections have come and gone, the by-election for the Queensland seat of Ryan has just been decided, there are elections yet to come in the Northern Territory, ACT, South Australia - and of course, the big one to be announced by the Prime Minister. We have been and will be bombarded with partisan political messages, the frequency of which few of us have ever experienced. Remarkably, amongst that partisan clamour,there will be an oasis of non-partisanship in Corowa, NewSouth Wales.
On December 1-2 this year, the Corowa Shire Council will host the second Corowa Conference. Leading figures from all major political parties and people with no involvement in politics will converge on Corowa to kick-start the stalled head-of-state issue. So far, those attending include ALP national president,Greg Sword, Liberal Party federal president, Shane Stone QC, Australian Democrats national president, Dr Michael Macklin, Australians for Constitutional Monarchy national convenor, Professor David Flint, Australian Republican Movement national chairman, Greg Barns and other leading Australians.1
What has inspired so many political opponents and contestants in the head-of-state debate to come together in Corowa? They share the concern that unless we lay down the framework now for making wise decisions on the issue, we will not pass on to future generations the strong, stable democracy and federation we have enjoyed.
The pressing task of resolving the issue of whether we separate from the monarchy and patriate the office of head of state from the United Kingdom to Australia is primarily one of reviving the skills of constitutional politics so successfull yused in respect of federation but missing a century later. Quite different techniques are needed to resolve an issue of whether to make a constitutional change that could alter the operation of our democracy throughout the whole federation, from those sufficient for ordinary partisan political issues. Partisan conflicts upon ordinary political issues which reflect conflicts of interest between sectors of the community are the basic stuff of a democracy and not to be decried. Their resolution does not need planning. They are resolved by elections and who in the result have the numbers in parliament. However, on the head-of-state issue the whole community shares a common interest in planning an effective process which ensures that which ever way the vote goes our democracy and federation will remain stable and secure.
Let us look at the positive lessons from the 1890s.
1893: the first Corowa plan
By 1891 the first move towards federation had produced a draft federal constitution prepared by a constitutional convention of delegates appointed by the colonial parliaments. It stalled because it lacked the processes to bring that constitution before the people for acceptance or otherwise. In 1893, supporters of federation organised a conference at Corowa. Most of the time was spent in expressions of strong support for federation. That gave speakers and listeners a warm feeling but achieved nothing else. Corowa made its first impact on national history when, on the second day, towards the end of the conference it dealt with process. After a short retirement with a small committee Dr Quick moved:
That in the opinion of this Conference the Legislature of each Australasian colony should pass an Act providing for the election of representatives to attend a statutory Convention or Congress to consider and adopt a Bill to establish a Federal Constitution for Australia, and upon the adoption of such Bill or measure it be submitted by some process of referendum to the verdict of each colony.2
It was passed unanimously and the Australian nation was the eventual result.
1895: the Hobart Premiers conference
The Corowa Plan had brought the people into the process at the stage of electing delegates to the convention and then again at the referendums. It provided the basis of an effective process but experience showed that it was not of itself enough. In 1895 the move towards federation was still stalled.
In his recent book, Faces of Federation: An Illustrated History, 3 John Laheyshows that the Corowa Plan lacked the mechanisms needed to introduce the positive input from governments and parliaments that would give its processes political momentum. The first step to introduce those mechanisms came when an influential political leader, George Reid, Premier of New South Wales, saw that it was to his political advantage to take the lead on federation. 4 He arranged a Premiers conference in Hobart in 1895. Lahey notes that at that meeting of heads of government, "there was an important change: politicians were brought into the process". 5 The Premiers brought in the Parliaments, deciding that when the convention had drafted its bill it was to go to each colonial Parliament which could propose amendments. Then the convention would reconvene, accept or reject those amendments and the resulting bill would go to referendum. A process was now in place that, with minor later variations, effectively resolved the federation issue.
The experience of the 1890s shows that the effective way of resolving an issue such as the head-of-state issue is the constitutional way. That requires the resources of people, parliaments and governments all to be used in working out the proposal ultimately put to referendum.
The experience of federation also shows the need, in resolving such an issue, to work without political partisanship. Free traders did not promote one type of constitution and protectionists another. They joined in putting together the best obtainable constitution as the framework within which to work out future political differences.
2001: the second Corowa plan
For reasons mentioned below, the head-of-state issue was not resolved by the 1999 referendum and the move to resolve it has stalled.
Does it matter that the issue remains unresolved? Opinion polls indicate that support for the colonial legacy of having our head of state in a foreign country on the other side of the world has almost evaporated. 6 The News poll in September 1999 showed 95 per cent agreeing that the head of state should be an Australian, 88 per cent strongly agreeing.7 But in the referendumtwo months later only 45 per cent voted for the package offered and in no state was there majority support. That indicates that over 40 per cent of voters were not satisfied they were offered an acceptable package and voted no despite their desire for an Australian head of state. A study made since the referendum as part of the Australian Election Study series shows 89 per cent agreeing an Australian should be head of state, 70 per cent agreeing strongly.8
Our constitution is at the heart of our association as a nation. Our political differences are worked out by reference to it. It is unhealthy to leave the body politic with a constitutional running sore where around 90 per cent do not identify with a central feature of the constitution close to national sentiment. The succession of long-lasting disputes over Canada's constitution since the late 1970s has weakened its cohesive authority and thus the democratic and federal compact of the country. 9 Australia's constitutional health demands early resolution of the head-of-stateissue.
John Lahey asked me to launch his book, Faces of Federation. My speech emphasised how his account of Corowa 1893, supplemented in Hobart, showed the potential of the process outlined in my book to restart the stalled head-of-state issue.10 Sir Zelman Cowen read my speech and in his notable speech of 31 October 2000 urged that the process be followed.11 Jack Hammond QC read both speeches and put to me his idea of Corowa again taking the initiative. He spoke to the Mayor, Cr. Gary Poidevin, who responded, "Sure, it can be done". Jack and I prepared a paper which we presented at Corowa. 12 On 19 December 2000 the Corowa Shire Council decided to hold the Corowa Peoples Conference 2001 on the weekend of 1-2 December 2001. The Patron of the Conference, Sir Zelman Cowen, will give its opening address.
The Conference is designed as the first step in progressing the head-of-state issue to early resolution. It will only consider and recommend a process to do that. It will not consider whether the federation should separate from the monarchy nor the merits of models proposed to replace it. The aim is to recommend a fair, informed and effective process to enable the people to decide those questions.
The Conference will proceed with an understanding of how the haphazard processes that ultimately produced the 1999 referendum failed to face up to the difficulties of the task of resolving the issue. Those difficulties emphasise how vital it is to start that task without delay.
As was the case with federation, resolving the head-of-state issue needs hard work and a realistic approach by many people. We must heed Griffith's advice to the 1891 Convention which Barton repeated to that of 1897: "It is no use for hon. Members to profess to want federation while they refuse to accept the means necessary to obtain it".13
1999: an unplanned referendum
To resolve any issue, it is basic that thought must be given to what the issue is, to the difficulties involved in resolving it and to the best process for doing so. There is little indication that much thought was given to any of these things in the years leading to 1999.
The issue is whether Australia has reached the stage of history where it is in our interest to separate finally from the monarchy, patriate the head of state to Australia and attain the state of entire constitutional autonomy. The federation is almost entirely autonomous now. The slim remaining constitutional dependence on Britain is that whoever is its monarch is monarch and formal head of state of the Commonwealth of Australia and each state, and appoints or dismisses the Governor-General and Governors as advised by the Prime Minister or state Premier. The Governor-General and Governors have long been the operative (or de facto) heads of state of their units of government, exercising their own constitutional powers and the remaining powers of the Queen as advised by their federal or state ministers.14 For years Australia has been a totally independent country in all that it does. It is only the shortfall in constitutional autonomy that prevents it from being a totally self-sufficient nation state.
To achieve that constitutional autonomy we must, in Professor Brian Galligan's words, "make what is in fact a relatively small but technically difficult change to the constitutional system".15 It is technically difficult because it has to be made throughout the federation and has to be made in a way which would not diminish the strength and stability of our democracy or federation.
Australia has one of the oldest and best democracies in the world. Its quality has endured primarily because the law of its constitutions and the operation of the constitutional system developed on that foundation, between them leave powerholders no real option but to exercise their powers consistently with the continuance of democracy and its safeguards. They have that effect because they combine both to provide incentives and disincentives andto bind powerholders to act in that way. Particularly important in this are the constitutional conventions which are made binding on power holders by the way the constitutional system actually works. The main difficulty in making the constitutional change to achieve complete autonomy is to ensure that a model which replaces the monarchy would not weaken these incentives and disincentives and would not lead the system to work in a way that would weaken or destroy the binding power of these constitutional conventions. Avoiding these unintended consequences depends very little on a knowledge of law but on a knowledge of humans and their behaviour within organisations, particularly when influenced by the impulsive attractions of obtaining or retaining power.16
There are difficulties other than the technical. Much of the received academic theory is unreliable because it describes the operation of the constitutional system as though it were analogous to the common law instead of by looking at what actually happens and why it happens.17 Further, for thirty years or so, education in Australia taught virtually nothing about the constitutional system of our democracy, a neglect which many affected by it now deeply resent.18
It is hard to point to any material advantage which the change would bring to Australia. Hopeful attempts to show it would bring benefits such as increased trade, have not had much success. The main identified advantage is primarily symbolic and of the mind and spirit. It is that the final achievement of constitutional maturity would lift satisfaction and identification with our constitutional system and enhance the way we see and feel about ourselves and our country, and the way that others see us.
The magnitude of the challenge of resolving the issue flows from the facts that while resolution of the issue whether to make the change is vital to our constitutional health, the change proposed is small and not likely to produce material benefit, and resolution of the issue will be difficult.
Many practical people are not interested to engage themselves in working out a change they see as a formality. Most of the theorists who takeit up have no appreciation of the unacceptable risks produced by distortions of the sophisticated balances on which the democracy of our system depends. There are no villains in the piece who want to damage our democracy. The peril comes from enthusiasts who think it easy and proceed without the knowledge, thought and care which are crucial.19
A semantic difficulty came from use of the word "republic". If the issue had initially been described as separating the federation from the monarchy and patriating the head of state to Australia, attention would have concentrated on how we could do that while retaining the integrity of our democracy and federation. Instead we talked of becoming a republic.In a loose sort of way that describes that change but it is a description which tends to confuse rather than inform people what is contemplated. It is prone to create the impression of a fundamental change to our system. It distracted many people away from concentrating on our democracy and federation and to focus instead on how to convert Australia to the form of the typical republic overseas.20
The word "republic" carries a strong aversion factor. While Australians are aware of the good democracy of republics such as the United States and Ireland, they have in their lifetime seen the tyrannical republics that produced Hitler, Stalin, Mao tse Tung, Pinochet, Idi Amin and Robert Mugabe.21 Australians who, or whose families came to Australia to escape such republics, tend to be repelled by the notion of a republic. In the interest of objective consideration of whether to make the change it is best to use language that clearly and neutrally describes what is intended and will be understood free of distorting intellectual or emotional images.
It is particularly difficult to see that the main decisions from which the process emerged were actuated much by the national interest. As John Button has written, Paul Keating woke up republican sentiment in 1993 and understood its symbolic power. "He held it in his hand like the Welcome Stranger gold nugget. Then he dropped it in the murky waters of acrimonious partisan politics".22 To negate the political advantage Keating was deriving from his promotion of a republic and criticism of the Coalition for not supporting it, John Howard undertook to hold a convention and put to referendum a model which had clear support, and the 1999 referendum was the result.23
That partisan approach is quite unsuited to constitutional politics in Australia where the support of all significant sectors of politics is necessary for constitutional change. Although there were some extras and alterations from the 1998 Constitutional Convention, the referendum model was in substance Paul Keating's original one. For a political party to originate a model and brand it as its property for use in extracting political advantage from its opponents, is to brand it as a referendum reject. This showed in the Newspoll of voting intention taken a week before the referendum. It indicated 53 per cent of ALP voters voting yes but 63 per cent of coalition voters voting no.24
It will puzzle posterity that, approaching a century of federation, a process was followed which did not even attempt to resolve the head-of-state issue for the states and disregarded their wellbeing. There is nothing to indicate that the Republic Advisory Committee ever considered a process which would have resolved the issue for the whole federation. 25 The motion for this at the Constitutional Convention was peremptorily rejected by the dominant group.26 The referendum was only on change to the system of the Commonwealth unit of the federation, and this would have occurred if supported by an overall majority of voters and a majority in at least four states. If there had been one or two dissenting states, despite the vote of their majority, they would have had to accept a Commonwealth system they had rejected and beenforced by circumstance and ridicule to change to republics at state level. This would have caused dismay in the dissenting states and have weakened the federation. 27 As is typical of federations, Australians have an affinity with their Commonwealth but also with their state.28
Federation was promoted so as to catch the public imagination and vision. 29 A change to make Australia wholly a self-sufficient nation state could have been promoted in that way: but not a proposal to change only the Commonwealth unit of the federation. If the referendum had passed, most of the federation - all of the states - would still have been monarchies.
The process that led to the referendum lacked the potential to resolve the issue in the constitutional way mentioned above. It was more a privatised way. The resources of members of parliaments and governments with their knowledge from experience of the actual working of the system of government, were scarcely used in putting together the proposal that went to referendum. The main input was left to one private organisation, the Australian Republican Movement, opposed and criticised primarily by another, Australians for Constitutional Monarchy. Beyond their members the people in reality had little input into the referendum proposal.30
The failed referendum itself produced difficulties. Both sides of politics had their fingers badly burnt in the referendum. Apart from enduring the strains of permitted public disagreement between party members, the Prime Minister, who clearly favoured a no vote, carried only 65 per cent of the Liberal Party's most recent electoral constituency that way. The Nationals opposed the package but a number of its members publicly supported it and the party carried only 80 per cent of its most recent constituency to a no vote. Labor has to accept that our democracy could not have lived with a basic feature of Keating's proposal which lasted until the Constitutional Convention. 31 Labor supported a yes votebut carriedonly 57 per cent of its most recent electoral constituency thatway.32
For understandable political reasons both sides have taken positions that would postpone their involvement in the issue. The Coalition treats the issue as having disappeared with the referendum.33 Labor's approach is first a plebiscite on whether we desire an Australian head of state, then another plebiscite on the preferred model and finally a referendum on whether to change the constitution. 34 If that process were eventually effective to resolve the issue, it would take many years. Fortunately, many within all parties are recognising the needs of Australia's constitutionalhealth and welcome the Corowa approach of placing the issue before all-party committees while the situation lasts that no party is promoting a particular model.
The issue of whether our head-of-state arrangements should be wholly within Australia will be resolved only in two events. If a referendum for it passes. Or if a sound and acceptable proposal for it is put and the voters reject it in the expression of a genuine preference against changing the present arrangements. Both these events depend on there being a sound and acceptable proposal. Enough has been said to show that the failure of the 1999 referendum left the issue unresolved.
A perfect proposal is unattainable in human constitutional affairs. The aim must be the best practical proposal that the experience, knowledge, hard work and thought of the people, parliaments and governments can produce.
The Corowa Peoples Conference
The Corowa Peoples Conference is designed to apply the lessons that come from the Australian experience discussed above. Its underlying principle is that the head-of-state issue will be resolved only by a referendum vote upon a proposal that can genuinely be presented so as to catch the public imagination and vision, and where people can vote free of partisan political impulse and secure in the knowledge that whichever way the vote goes our democracy and federation will be safe for future generations.
The aim of the Conference is to recommend the most suitable process to enable the people to decide whether to separate the federation from the monarchy and which head-of-state model is preferred to replace it if that occurs. Ultimately, before the people make those decisions it is essential that different views on those questions be placed before them in strong and informed debate. At the present stage the priority is to put in place a fair, informative and effective process to enable those decisions to be made. That is why the Conference will not discuss or consider those questions but concentrate entirely on process.
Because it is considering only process, it is feasible and most important that the Conference operate on a non-partisan basis. There is not the slightest reason why the views of conference members as to what is a fair, informative and effective process should differ according to whether they are supporters of a particular political party or of no political party: nor according to whether they support or oppose separation from the monarchy, support a particular model or have no formed view on those points. Every effort is being made to ensure that the Conference include people of all view points and operate in a non-partisan context. It is highly desirable to produce as much consensus on process as is possible.
A non-partisan approach is also important because parts of the process on which the Conference would be expected to make recommendations, need to be designed to operate in a non-partisan way. This approach at the Conference would also encourage political parties later to act so that people will vote in the proposed plebiscites and referendum free of partisan political impulse. The object is a process where people vote on their view of the merits rather than through loyalty to a political party.
The Conference and proposed process have features suitable to a mature federation and little used before. Reliance will be placed on the recent machinery of co-operative federalism which enables the governments of the federation to decide together on a course to be followed: 35 and on a wide set of powers of constitutional amendment, including particularly the powers created by the Australia Acts 1986 which enable the whole federation to make constitutional change by acting together.
As with the first Corowa Conference, the success of this conference will dependentirely on the persuasive force of its recommendations. Proposals for implementing the process regarded by Sir Zelman Cowen as combining "political realism with expert advice",36 will beplaced before the Conference.37 The Conference would be expected to recommend implementation of that processor an improvement of it or a better one. The Premiers conferences of 1895 and later, emerged as the natural activating agency of the process recommended by the first Corowa Plan. The second Corowa Plan would look to the meetings of the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers, meeting as the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), for that.
As the Conference will recommend a practical process, naturally it is sought to attract practical people who bring community commonsense with them, including a good number who also bring an understanding of the actual working of our system of government. About half the members will be invited individually. They include current and former Prime Ministers, Premiers, Chief Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition: former operative heads of state: current presiding officers of the Parliaments: current Australian presidents of the main political parties and parliamentary leaders of political parties within the various Parliaments: current independent members of parliament: people representative of local government: and people representative of the various positions taken in the head-of-state debate. Invitations will go to people whose capacity to understand the working of the constitutional system comes from learning or from experience in business, unions or other organisations. The other half will be self-selected - people who register as members in response to general advertised invitations. The aim is to attract members from both genders, youth, each state and territory, regional areas and capital cities and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
It is proposed that the Conference recommend that all-party committees in each state and territory Parliament investigate, listen to people's views and report on two questions: Which head-of-state model would best preserve or improve our democracy if the federation separated from the monarchy?38 What method of deciding the head-of-state issue would least strain the federation? When those reports have been made, an all-party committee within the federal Parliament, also including a representative from each state and territory committee, would consider those committees' reports and make such investigation and consultation as it considers appropriate. Then it would make its report on the two questions and append to it the state and territory reports. 39
On the first of those questions a great deal of attention will necessarily be given to the method by which the head of state is to be chosen and placed in office and the method of dismissal.40 Because the units of governmentof the Commonwealth, states and Northern Territory have essentially the same systems, the factors which would lead a model to be chosen as the best to preserve or improve democracy in one unit would also be present in the other units.41
It is proposed that a method of deciding the head-of-state issue with minimum strain to the federation be recommended by the Corowa Conference for consideration by the all-party parliamentary committees. Under that method, after sufficient time for the community to consider and debate the report of the Federal All Party Parliamentary Committee, there would be a plebiscite where the people of each unit of the federation choose the model they prefer for the head of state of their unit.42 The voters of the Commonwealth will choose its model, and the voters of each state and territory will choose the model for their state or territory. If the process has the support of all significant sectors of politics and works effectively, there is no reason why each voter in the federal election to be held by 2004 could not also fill in a ballot paper on the model preferred for the Commonwealth and another on the model preferred for their state or territory. Another possibility is that the two ballot papers on the models could be filled in as part of a separate postal ballot where voters would have time to consider explanatory material and make their decisions. There is no constitutional necessity for each unit of the federation to have the same type of model, but in an informed process such as this, the absence of cultural differences of any depth between the states and territories makes it most probable that uniformity in the choice of model would emerge. There is no constitutional need for the Commonwealth and each state and territory to have the same person as head of state of them all, as, in a formal sense the Queen is now. The system would work quite satisfactorily if each of them had their own person as its head of state.43
Finally, all Australian electors would vote in one Australia-wide referendum on the single question of whether the whole federation - all its units - separate from the monarchy. That method would enable the change to be made with constitutional and political legitimacy and without strain on the federation. No change would occur without the approval of the voters of every state. The people of a unit would not have to accept for that unit any model other than that chosen in its plebiscite. If supported by the overall majority of Australian voters, a majority in every state and a request under the Australia Acts from each state Parliament, the whole federation would separate from the monarchy at the same time, with each unit converting to the model chosen in its plebiscite. Otherwise there would be no change.44 Either way, the issue would be resolved, at least for many years.
One of its first steps will introduce the consensus approach to the Corowa Conference. A non-partisan Drafting Committee with members nominated by the main political parties, one representative of small parties and Independents and one community representative will be appointed. Its task will be the prompt drafting of legislation which the Parliaments could pass to set up the all-party parliamentary committees.45
Steps will be taken from the outset to involve the people in the process and keep them informed. Already there is an internet invitation to any Australian to make comments or suggestions on the draft program and proposals. 46 Having the inquiries initiated by the all-party committees in the states and territories brings the process and the information it will generate, close to the people from the start. The basic information such as the report of the Corowa Conference and the report of the Federal All Party Parliamentary Committee is to be placed on Internet where people will have direct access to it.47
The information and expert advice which the process will make available must produce an informed debate on the merits of the models. For example, the report of the federal parliamentary committee will identify the competing models with at least the detail required by the 1998 Constitutional Convention and the merits and demerits claimed in respect of them. 48 In the fortuitous process that emerged in the years leading to the 1999 referendum the absence of informed debate was the most serious defect. Debate avoidance was rife. Supporters of a model were able to smother an unanswerable criticism of their model and avoid giving any reasoned answer, aware that any reasoned response would only draw attention to the undeniable defect. Instead,the typical response was to pour ridicule on the critic. It was open to the supporters of one model to misrepresent the structures of another and criticise it on that basis. In the absence of information it was hard for people to assess the validity of such criticisms. It will be very difficult to avoid rational debate if the proposed process is followed.
In resolving this issue Australians of the information age want only what will work, want to decide themselves what will work and want the information and expert advice to enable them to do so.49 The Corowa proposals will facilitate that. Like the first Corowa Plan, the second Corowa Plan will be an orderly exercise in people power by people who know that, as their democracy belongs to them, so does the responsibility for maintaining its constitutional health. It will enable the people to steer their democracy in the direction they want it to go. If the plan achieves that, Corowa will once again have served its nation well.
Endnotes
Those from politics include ACT Chief Minister Gary Humphries (Liberal); ACT Leader of the Opposition, Jon Stanhope (ALP); NSW Leader of the Opposition, Kerry Chikarovski (Liberal); Tasmanian Leader of the Opposition, Sue Napier (Liberal); Former Leader of the National Party and federal member for Farrer, Tim Fischer and Victorian Leader of the National Party, Peter Ryan. Others attending include former Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser; former High Court Chief Justice, Sir Gerard Brennan; former High Court Justice, Sir Daryl Dawson; former Victorian Premier, Sir Rupert Hamer; Chairman of the Australian Republican Movement, Greg Barns; National Convenor, Australians for Constitutional Monarchy, Professor David Flint; Baptist Minister, Reverend Tim Costello and former independent federal member, Phil Cleary.
John Quick and Robert R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, (1901), Legal Books, Sydney, 1995, p. 153.
John Lahey, Faces of Federation. An Illustrated History, Royal Historical Society of Victoria, Melbourne, 2000.
Alfred Deakin, "And be one people": Alfred Deakin's Federal Story. Edited by Stuart Macintyre. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 54-9, 62-4.
p. 33.
It was held in Sue v. Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, that the United Kingdom is a foreign power.
Weekend Australian, 9-10 October 1999, p. 8.
Bob Birrell, Federation: The Secret Story, Duffy Snellgrove, Sydney, 2001, pp. 325-7.
Richard E. McGarvie, Democracy: choosing Australia's republic, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1999, pp. 5-6.
Paper 36, "Federation's Lessons for Restarting the Stalled Move to Resolve the Republic Issue", on themcgarvie website. Numbered papers in later end notes are also on that website. The process is outlined in Democracy, pp.255-63.
Zelman Cowen, "Wisdom and Hope", St James Ethics Centre, 10th Anniversary Lecture, Melbourne, 31 October 2000.
Paper 38, "Corowa Peoples Conference 2001: Restarting Another Stalled Move".
John Lahey, Faces of Federation, p. 39.
Democracy, pp. 16-23
Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p. 4.
Democracy, pp. 7-11, 46-8, 53-61, 76-83, 88-91,264.
Ibid. , pp. 53-6, 145-8, 157-162.
Ibid. , pp. 268-9.
For comment on such enthusiasts, see Paul Hasluck, "Reflections on Australia's Constitution", Quadrant, March 1993, p. 12.
Democracy, p. 4.
Compare the comments of NSW Premier Bob Carr in, Michelle Grattan, "Republic-lite only chance says Carr", Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 2000, p. 4.
John Button, On the Loose, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 1996, p. 131.
That approach had been advanced by Alexander Downer when he was Leader of the Opposition.
Australian, 2 November 1999, p. 6.
Republic Advisory Committee, An Australian Republic: The Options (Malcolm Turnbull, Chairman), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, vol. 1.
Australia, Constitutional Convention (1998), Report of the Constitutional Convention, Old Parliament House, Canberra,2-13February 1998, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Barton, ACT, 1998 vol. 1, p. 43; vol. 4, pp. 696-8, 754-5, 823-4.
R. E. McGarvie, "The Timely Resolution of the Republic Issue", in Rick Brown (ed.), The NO Case Papers, Standard Publishing House, Sydney, 1999, pp. 86-7.
Democracy, pp. 247-8.
Helen Irving, To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia's Constitution, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne,1997, ch. 2, "The Imaginary Nation"; Bob Birrell, Federation,chs 1-5.
Paper 38, "Corowa Peoples Conference2001: Restarting Another Stalled Move", by Richard E. McGarvie and Jack Hammond QC; Democracy, p. 270.
Democracy, pp. 88-92, 95-101; Malcolm Fraser, "A Republic with a Constitutional Council the Best Option", Australian, 2 July 1997, p. 13; George Winterton, "A Reply to McGarvie", Adelaide Review, November 1997, pp. 16-17; Malcolm Turnbull, "Fighting for the Republic: The Ultimate Insider's Account", Hardie Grant Books, Melbourne, 1999, pp. 39-40.
The percentages indicating how the most recent electoral constituencies of the parties voted, come from the estimates of Associate Professor Malcolm Mackerras in his paper, "The Inner Metropolitan Republic", presented to the Twelfth Conference of the Samuel Griffith Society, November 2000.
e.g. "Republic debate is over, PM declares", Australian, 10 July 2000, p. 2; "Republic is off for decades: Costello",Age, 27 January 2001, p. 1.
"Plebiscite plan wins approval", Australian, 1 August 2000, p. 5. Although not always followed in the past, in modern Australian usage a vote which will merely indicate voters' opinion is usually called a plebiscite and a vote which can actually alter the constitution is usually called a referendum.
Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic, pp. 203-13.
Zelman Cowen, "Wisdom and Hope", pp. 16-17.
Paper 40 sets out the Draft Proposals. In their practical application the proposals in Democracy, pp. 255-63, have been extended by the addition of state and territory all-party parliamentary committees (Draft Proposal 3.2), plebiscites (7.1) and a Drafting Committee (2 and 4).
The words "or improve" were added to this question on 23 May 2001 as a result of a comment to the Mayor of the Corowa Shire Council by Professor George Winterton. Copies of this paper published after that date include these words.
Paper 40, Draft Proposal 3.
Democracy, pp. 8-12, 16-17, 42, 61, 88-9, 121-2.
Ibid. , pp. 16-23. In the Australian Capital Territory the limited role of head of state is performed by the Governor-General.
Paper 40, Draft Proposal 7.1.
Compare Democracy, p. 240.
Paper 40, Draft Proposal 7.2. Democracy ,pp. 256-9, shows how the constitutional amendment powers may be used with legal validity to separate the whole federation from the monarchy at the same time.
Paper 40, Draft Proposals 2 and 4.
Paper 40, "Invitation to Comment on the Draft Program and Proposals for the Corowa Peoples Conference 2001" Soon this paper will also be on the Corowa Conference website.
Ibid., Draft Proposals 3.2, 3.3, 4, 5, 6 and 8.
Ibid., Draft Proposal 3.4.
Compare Dick Morris, The New Prince: Machiavelli Updated for the Twenty-first Century, Renaissance Books, Los Angeles, 1999, pp. 23-6.
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